Cartel Stability with Quality-Anchored Buyers

Bos, Iwan and Cesi, Berardino and Marini, Marco A. (2025): Cartel Stability with Quality-Anchored Buyers. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 254, (20 June 2025)

Abstract

This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Captive Consumers, Cartel Stability, Collusion, Quality-Anchored Buyers, Ver- tical Product Differentiation.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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