An Optimal Crime Control Policy in a Dynamic Setting

Nawaz, Nasreen and Saeed, Omer (2021): An Optimal Crime Control Policy in a Dynamic Setting. Published in: Journal of Quantitative Economics , Vol. 20, No. 4 (2022): pp. 827-880.

Abstract

Existing literature does not capture efficiency losses on the dynamic adjustment path of crime control market from initial to final equilibrium after a shock in order to formulate an optimal crime control policy. Furthermore, number of public service units and crime control rate are major determinants of crimes controlled in a society, and a policy without taking into consideration such vital determinants cannot ensure adjustment of number of crimes controlled as a result of cost movement in desired time, which may lead to extra efficiency losses than those envisaged during policy formulation for an optimal level of crime control in a society. This article designs a comprehensive optimal crime control policy mechanism by modeling a three dimensional crime control system in society capturing number of public service units, crime control rate, and cost, while taking into account efficiency losses during adjustment of crime control market, crime control rate and number of public service units in addition to those which result due to movements from initial to final equilibriums.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Crime, Optimal Policy, Adjustment Path, Equilibrium, Coordination
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A14 - Sociology of Economics; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H19 - Other; H - Public Economics > H8 - Miscellaneous Issues > H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits

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