Nsakaza, Kalimanshi and Arogundade, Sodiq and Jimaima, Mulala (2025): A three-way dynamic causality analysis on domestic credit risk, external debt, and external debt servicing and its implications on debt sustainability initiatives: Evidence from Zambia.
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Abstract
This paper presents a mathematical economic model to analyze a three-way dynamic causality analysis on commercial banks credit risk, external debt and external debt servicing and its implications on debt sustainability initiatives in Zambia. The results showed a unidirectional causal relationship between external debt and commercial banks' credit risk using a VECM with a consistent 1.659 percent increase in external debt as a proportion of GDP followed a 1 percent increase in banks' credit risk, indicating a vicious cycle. Additionally, we found that for every percentage increase in debt service as a share of GDP, there is a 0.9 percent increase in credit risk. The repayment of foreign debt also had a positive effect on the external debt. Based on this, we concluded that although debt treatment procedures have paved the way for a recovery path, a focus on reducing bank credit risk is necessary to keep the positive impacts of these activities from being undermined by a repo effect.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | A three-way dynamic causality analysis on domestic credit risk, external debt, and external debt servicing and its implications on debt sustainability initiatives: Evidence from Zambia. |
English Title: | A three-way dynamic causality analysis on domestic credit risk, external debt, and external debt servicing and its implications on debt sustainability initiatives: Evidence from Zambia. |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Key words: Vicious cycle, External Debt, Credit Risk, Debt Service Suspension initiative, Vector Error Correction Model |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling > C54 - Quantitative Policy Modeling F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance |
Item ID: | 125827 |
Depositing User: | Mr. Kalimanshi Nsakaza |
Date Deposited: | 27 Aug 2025 08:26 |
Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2025 08:26 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/125827 |