Institutional Arrangements for Coordination Among Governments in Germany

Spahn, Paul Bernd (2001): Institutional Arrangements for Coordination Among Governments in Germany. Published in: Frankfurter Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge No. 106 (2001)

Abstract

The theory of fiscal federalism makes a strong case for decentralizing government functions in order to enhance the efficiency of allocating public goods where preferences differ among regions. Decentralized collective decision making fosters social and political cohesion at the level of the nation state by protecting minorities, by strengthening the accountability of politicians, and by mobilizing citizens through greater participation at the local level. Federalism respects different cultural and individual traditions among regions, and it emphasizes local diversity. Federalism thus reflects the regional dimension of democracy. However, decentralized government raises severe coordination problems. Coordination of public agencies within government—among the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicature, and the Administration—is difficult enough, yet it is further complicated in a multi-layer government framework where different authorities interact—governments and parliaments that are more or less autonomous and accountable to their respective constituencies. This may call for specific institutional provisions and rules for policy coordination and for dealing with conflicts between the levels of government. The focus of this paper is on the mechanisms of coordination as established in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with its specific tradition of “cooperative federalism”.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: government; coordination; federalism; cooperative federalism; budget coordination
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H70 - General; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; H - Public Economics > H8 - Miscellaneous Issues > H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H74 - State and Local Borrowing

References

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Reissert, Bernd (1978), “Responsibility Sharing and Joint Tasks in West German Federalism“, in Paul Bernd Spahn (Ed.), Principles of Federal Policy Co-ordination in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Issues and Annotated Legislation, Research Monograph No. 25, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 24-41.

Spahn, Paul Bernd (1978), “The German Model of Horizontal Federal Decentralisation”, in Paul Bernd Spahn (Ed.), Principles of Federal Policy Co-ordination in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Issues and Annotated Legislation, Research Monograph No. 25, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 3-23.

Spahn, Paul Bernd and Jan Werner (2007), „Germany at the Junction Between Solidarity and Subsidiarity,“ Chapter 4 of Robert Ebel and Richard Bird (eds.), Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries: Subsidiarity, Solidarity and Asymmetrie, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp. 89-113.

Spahn, Paul Bernd, and Oliver Franz (2002), „Consensus Democracy and Interjurisdictional Fiscal Solidarity in Germany“, in Ehtisham Ahmad, and Vito Tanzi (eds.), Managing Fiscal Decentralization, Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy, London and New York, 2002, pp. 122-143.(Washington D.C.).

Spahn, Paul Bernd, Wolfgang Föttinger, and Imke Steinmetz (1996), Tax Assignment and Tax Administration in the German Model of Co-operative Federalism, Frankfurter Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Nr. 70, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften , Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main.