Bandeira, Pablo (2009): El desarrollo institucional en el contexto de la ineficacia de la ayuda: ¿qué podemos hacer?
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Abstract
What is institutional development? How important is it? Which institutions promote development? Why they are not naturally implemented? How can we support them? These are the questions that this article tries to answer, based on the recent international literature on the topic, within the framework of current aid ineffectiveness.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | El desarrollo institucional en el contexto de la ineficacia de la ayuda: ¿qué podemos hacer? |
English Title: | Promoting institutional development in the context of actual aid ineffectiveness: what can we do? |
Language: | Spanish |
Keywords: | Institutional Development, Good Governance, Aid Effectiveness |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies |
Item ID: | 13372 |
Depositing User: | Pablo Bandeira |
Date Deposited: | 13 Feb 2009 08:42 |
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2019 10:21 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/13372 |