Iyer, Karthik and Huhns, Michael (2005): Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation. Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , Vol. 3760, (October 2005): pp. 453-465.
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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of the resource among n agents in a fair manner. The protocol enables agents to choose portions based on their internal utility function, which they do not have to reveal. In addition to being fair, the protocol has desirable features such as being unbiased and verifiable while allocating resources. In the case where the resource is two-dimensional (a circular cake) and uniform, it is shown that each agent can get close to l/n of the whole resource.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Utility theory ; Utility function ; Bargaining ; Artificial intelligence ; Resource allocation ; Multiagent system |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory |
Item ID: | 145 |
Depositing User: | Karthik Iyer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Oct 2006 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 11:51 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/145 |