Brams, Steven J. and Jones, Michael A. and Klamler, Christian (2010): Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm. Forthcoming in: SIAM Review (2011)
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Abstract
We analyze a class of proportional cake-cutting algorithms that use a minimal number of cuts (n-1 if there are n players) to divide a cake that the players value along one dimension. While these algorithms may not produce an envy-free or efficient allocation--as these terms are used in the fair-division literature--one, divide-and-conquer (D&C), minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player can envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively to place marks on a cake--valued along a line--that divide it into equal halves (when n is even) or nearly equal halves (when n is odd), then halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C ensures players of at least 1/n shares, as they each value the cake, if and only if they are truthful. However, D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are briefly discussed.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | mechanism design; fair division; divisible good; cake-cutting; divide-and-choose |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
Item ID: | 22704 |
Depositing User: | Steven J. Brams |
Date Deposited: | 17 May 2010 13:38 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 16:26 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/22704 |