Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty

Sakellaris, Kostis (2010): Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty.

Abstract

The last decade has seen an increasing application of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008), where the market is described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Capacity Constraints; Electricity Markets; Regulatory Policy; Strategic Behaviour
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling; L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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