Changing Threat Perceptions and the Efficient Provisioning of International Security

Gupta, Rupayan (2010): Changing Threat Perceptions and the Efficient Provisioning of International Security.

Abstract

This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international institutions for the efficient provision of global security. In that paper, the level of threat by a rogue nation was assumed as being exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to the one seen in Gupta (2010) to analyze the robustness of the results seen in that paper, in the case where the threat is endogenized. Additionally, this paper investigates how the evolution of public opinion in the respective countries facing the rogue nation's threat, impacts the efficient provisioning of global security.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Alliances; Conflict; Security
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H8 - Miscellaneous Issues > H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; International Public Goods; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

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