On the optimal mix of patent instruments

Chu, Angus C. and Furukawa, Yuichi (2010): On the optimal mix of patent instruments.

Abstract

A special characteristic of the patent system is that it features multiple patent-policy levers that can be employed by policymakers. In this study, we develop a quality-ladder model to analyze the optimal mix of patent instruments. Specifically, we consider (a) patent breadth and (b) the division of profit in research joint ventures. We analytically derive optimal patent policies and then calibrate the model to quantitatively evaluate the welfare gain from optimizing both patent instruments as compared to optimizing only one patent instrument. In summary, we find that the welfare gain can be substantial.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: R&D; innovation; intellectual property rights
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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