Ambiguous Information and Market Entry: An Experimental Study

Brandts, Jordi and Yao, Lan (2010): Ambiguous Information and Market Entry: An Experimental Study.

Abstract

We study experimentally how entry into a market with uncertain capacity is affected by the type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in a two-market entry game. In the risky information market there are two possible market capacities, both known to occur with probability 1/2. In the ambiguous information market the two possible market capacities effectively occur with probability 1/2 but participants are only told that there is uncertainty about capacities. We find that average entry is higher under ambiguous information than under risky information. To control for comparison effects and the effects of strategic interaction in the two market environment we also study a two-lottery individual decision problem and one market entry games with ambiguous and risky information. For these two cases the experimental results show no difference between information conditions. Our results are consistent with the notion that complex strategic interaction leads to higher market entry under ambiguous information.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Market entry games; Experiment; Risk; Ambiguity.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M2 - Business Economics; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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