Knack, Stephen (2002): Governance and growth: measurement and evidence. Published in: IRIS Center Discussion Papers , Vol. 02, No. 05
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Abstract
This paper describes the gradual accumulation of indicators and evidence of the links between governance and growth, focusing on broad cross-country analyses. While each governance indicator developed thus far is in some way imperfect, the faults of some measures are entirely independent from those of others. Therefore, in aggregate, the totality of indicators point in the same direction: good governance is crucial for growth. Unfortunately, while current indicators are getting better at determining the quality of governance, they still are unable to implicate particular institutional arrangements that donors should devote their attention and resources towards. Moreover, the subjectivity of some indicators invites suspicion from local governments and makes reform difficult.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Governance and growth: measurement and evidence |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | governance, growth, institutional development |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements |
Item ID: | 28050 |
Depositing User: | Stephen Knack |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jan 2011 12:34 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 09:05 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/28050 |