Jin, Yu (2010): Credit Termination and the Technology Bubbles.
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Abstract
We study the role of firms' credit histories in a business cycle model. Loans are dynamic contracts between banks and firms, and credit terminations are used as an incentive device. Banks deny future loans to an entrepreneur according to his credit histories in order to affect his choice of project ex ante. This will generate fluctuations from technology shocks to the riskiness of different types of projects as occurred during the technology bubbles. The model is used to explain the boom-and-bust of the dot-com bubble, one leading example of technology bubbles in the economy, in the late 1990s.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Credit Termination and the Technology Bubbles |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | credit terminations; technology bubbles |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E32 - Business Fluctuations ; Cycles G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages |
Item ID: | 29010 |
Depositing User: | Yu Jin |
Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2011 14:26 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 21:29 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/29010 |