Wu, Haoyang (2011): Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle.
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Abstract
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world. More importantly, we find that the revelation principle is not always right by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Revelation principle |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 30653 |
Depositing User: | Haoyang Wu |
Date Deposited: | 05 May 2011 01:09 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 04:33 |
References: | 1. E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38. 2. A. Postlewaite and D. Schmeidler, Implementation in differential information economies. \emph{Journal of Economic theory}, \textbf{39} (1986) 14-33. 3. T.R. Palfrey and S. Srivastava, Implementation with incomplete information in exchange economies, \emph{Econometrica}, \textbf{57} (1989) 115-134. 4. M.O. Jackson, Bayesian implementation. \emph{Econometrica}, \textbf{59} (1991) 461-477. 5. H. Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat ``bad'' social choice rules. \emph{International Journal of Quantum Information}, \textbf{9} (2011) 615-623.\\ http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294 6. H. Wu, On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. \emph{Theoretical Computer Science}, 2011 (submitted).\\ http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.5327 7. R. Serrano, The theory of implementation of social choice rules, \emph{SIAM Review} \textbf{46} (2004) 377-414. 8. Mas-Colell, A., MD Whinston, and JR Green, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 9. H. Matsushima, Bayesian monotonicity with side payments, \emph{Journal of Economic Theory} \textbf{59} (1993) 107-121. 10. A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Nash equilibria in quantum games with generalized two-parameter strategies, \emph{Phys. Lett. A} \textbf{363} (2007) 381-388. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/30653 |
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