Botnet economics and devising defence schemes from attackers’ own reward processes

Pau, Louis-François (2010): Botnet economics and devising defence schemes from attackers’ own reward processes.

Abstract

This paper focuses on botnet economics and design of defensive strategies. It takes the view that by combining scarce information on the attackers’ business models, with rational economic analysis of these business processes, one can identify design rules for economic defense mechanisms which the target can implement, often in a cheap way in addition to technical means. A short survey of game theory in the security area, is followed by a real case of an Internet casino. This leads to develop a model, applicable to this case and others, which is presented first qualitatively then quantitatively. This allows carrying out different analyses based on different equilibrium or termination principles; the ones studied are reward break-even analysis, and Max-Min analysis from game theory, for the target and the attackers. On that basis, a number of specific economic and information led defense strategies are identified which can be further studied using the model and specific adaptations to other data or cases.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Botnets, Economics, Game theory, Internet casinos, Cyber defense
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software; N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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