Strategic voting and nomination

Green-Armytage, James (2011): Strategic voting and nomination.

Abstract

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: strategic voting; tactical voting; strategic nomination; Condorcet; alternative vote; Borda count; approval voting
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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