Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

Noussair, Charles and van Soest, Daan and Stoop, Jan (2011): Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment.

Abstract

We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Field experiment, public goods game, social preferences, punishment, reward
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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