Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

Bhowmik, Anuj and Cao, Jiling (2011): Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information.

Abstract

In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Asymmetric information; Exactly feasible; Ex-post core; mixed economy; NY-fine core; NY-private core; Robustly efficient allocation; NY-strong fine core; RW-fine core; Walrasian expectations allocation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D41 - Perfect Competition; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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