Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Hausken, Kjell (2012): Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder. Forthcoming in: Defence and peace Economics

Abstract

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Commentary on: UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
• Language: English
• Keywords: Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Conflict; Contest; Network; Colonel Blotto game
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

Hausken, K. (2008a) Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems. European Journal of Operational Research 186(2) 856-881.

Hausken, K. (2008b) Strategic Defense and Attack for Reliability Systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 93(11) 1740-1750.

Hausken, K. (2012) Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply 1 to comment 1. Defence and Peace Economics forthcoming.

Hausken, K. and Levitin, G. (2009), “Protection vs. False Targets in Series Systems,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety 94, 5, 973-981.

Hirshleifer, J. (1995) Anarchy and Its Breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103(1) 26-52.

Kovenock, D. and Roberson, B. (2012a) Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment. Defence and Peace Economics Forthcoming.

Kovenock, D. and Roberson, B. (2012b) Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder. Defence and Peace Economics Forthcoming.

Nash, J. (1951), Non-cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54(2) 286–295,

Selten, R. (1965) Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragentragheit. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 12, 201-324.

Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Zermelo, E. (1913) Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, Proc. Fifth Congress Mathematicians, (Cambridge 1912), Cambridge University Press 1913, 501-504.