Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions

Béal, Sylvain and Rémila, Eric and Solal, Philippe (2012): Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions.

Abstract

We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states the two players incident to the link should be affected similarly while fairness for neighbors states that a player incident to the link and any of his other neighbors should be affected similarly. Fairness for neighbors is also used to characterize the component-wise egalitarian surplus solution and a two-step egalitarian solution. These results highlight that egalitarian and marginalistic allocation rules can be obtained by applying the same equal gain/loss property to different types of players.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Myerson value; component-wise egalitarian solutions; fairness; fairness for neighbors; two-step value
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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