Scoring rules for judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz (2011): Scoring rules for judgment aggregation.

Abstract

This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called `scoring rules' after their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the collective judgments which reach the highest total `score' across the individuals, subject to the judgments having to be rational. Depending on how we define `scores', we obtain several (old and new) solutions to the judgment aggregation problem,such as distance-based aggregation, premise- and conclusion-based aggregation, truth-tracking rules, and a Borda-type rule. Scoring rules are shown to generalize the classical scoring rules of preference aggregation theory.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: judgment aggregation, social choice, scoring rules, Hamming rule, Borda rule, premise- and conclusion-based rules
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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