A behavioral note on the demand for health

Tavares, Aida Isabel (2007): A behavioral note on the demand for health.

Abstract

On this note we introduce some behavioral hypothesis on the static version of Grossman model on the demand for health. Three behavioral hypotheses are considered in the static version of Grossman model: the status, the social pressure and trust. We show that a preference for status and for social approval result in a higher optimal choice for health. The same cannot be concluded when considering the influence of trust. The variable trust has an ambiguous result on the optimal health decision of individuals.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: health demand, Grossman model, behavioral factors
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I10 - General

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