Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation

Hessami, Zohal and Silke, Uebelmesser (2012): Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation.

Abstract

There is a dearth of research on the determinants of in-kind redistribution. Using dynamic panel data estimations for 32 OECD countries, we show that the in-kind share of social benefits is lower under left-wing governments. This effect is weakened when left-wing governments respond to inflation by increasing the share of in-kind transfers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: In-kind redistribution; social benefits; partisan biases; inflation
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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