A non-monetary form of Clarke pivotal voting

Pivato, Marcus (2007): A non-monetary form of Clarke pivotal voting.

Abstract

The Clarke Pivotal Voting Mechanism (CPVM) elicits truthful revelation of utility functions by requiring any `pivotal' voter to pay a monetary `Clarke tax'. This neglects wealth effects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose to replace the `Clarke tax' with a lottery, wherein the pivotal voter risks long-term exclusion from the CPVM (and any other formal political participation). The resulting voting mechanism is nonmanipulable, politically egalitarian, and implements something close to Relative Utilitarianism.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Department of Mathematics, Trent University
• Language: English
• Keywords: Pivotal Voting Mechanism; demand-revealing mechanism; Groves-Clarke; Clarke tax; Relative Utilitarianism
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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