Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina

Meloni, Osvaldo (2012): Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina.

Abstract

In the last three decades Argentina tripled its crime rate boosting safety at the top of mayor concerns of Argentineans which leaves open the question about the behavior of incumbent governors of the 23 provinces about anti-crime measures in the proximity of elections. How do incumbent governors react to escalating crime as elections come closer? This paper investigates electorally-motivated crime rate fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1984-2007. District–level dynamic panel data reveals the existence of an electoral cycle in the total crime rate as well as in property crimes.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Crime, Electoral cycles, Dynamic Panel Data, Argentina
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

References

Arellano M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application of Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-297.

Berdejó C. and Yuchtman, N., 2010. Crime, punishment, and politics: an analysis of political cycles in criminal sentencing. Mimeo.

Brender, A. and Drazen, A., 2005. Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1271-1295.

Cerro A. and Meloni, O., 1999. Análisis Económico de las Políticas de Prevención y Represión del Delito en la Argentina. EUDECOR. Cordoba.

Cerro A. and Meloni, O., 2000. Determinants of the crime rate in Argentina during the 90’s. Estudios de Economía 27 (2), 297-311.

Dyke, A., 2007. Electoral cycles in the administration of criminal justice. Public Choice 133 (3), 417-437.

Drazen A. and Eslava, M., 2005. Electoral manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and evidence. NBER Working Paper No. 11085. January.

Eslava, M., 2006. The Political economy of Fiscal policy: survey. Inter-American Development Bank. Working Paper No. 583.

Galli, E. and Rossi, S., 2002. Political Budget Cycles: the case of the Western German Länder. Public Choice 110, 282-303.

Ghosh, A., 2006. Electoral Cycles in Crime in a developing country: evidence from the Indian states. Social Science Research Network. ID910054.

Jones, M., Meloni, O. and Tommasi, M. (2012) Voters as Fiscal Liberals. Incentives and accountability in federal systems. Economics and Politics. Vol. 24(2). July.

Lema, D., 2009. Conditional political budget cycle in argentine provinces. Documento de trabajo Nº 389. Universidad del CEMA. December.

Levitt, S., 1997. Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime. American Economic Review 87(3), 270–290.

McCrary, J.,2002. Do electoral cycles in police hiring really help us estimate the effect of police on crime? Comment. American Economic Review 92(4), 1236–1243.

Meloni, O.,2010. Budget manipulation and vertical fiscal imbalance. Paper presented at the XXXIX International Congress Latin American Studies Association (LASA) October 2010, Toronto, Canada.

Naci Mocan, H. and Bali, T., 2005. Asymmetric crime cycles. NBER Working paper 11210.

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G., 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.

Petry, F., Imbeau, L., Crête, J. and Clavet, M., 1999. Electoral and Partisan Cycles in the Canadian Provinces. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 32 (2), 273-292.

Rogoff, K. and Siebert, A., 1988. Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of Economic Studies 55, 1-16.