A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy

Caruso, Raul (2007): A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy.

Abstract

This paper presents a model of conflict in an economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector labelled as contested sector two agents struggle in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In a second sector, the uncontested sector, each agent holds secure property rights over the production of some goods. Both agents maximize an income function which can be described as a function of contributions of both sectors. Results show that the degree of returns in the uncontested sector is a powerful force which countervails the impact of destructive and unproductive interaction in the contested sector.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Conflict; Productive and Unproductive Activities; Butter and Guns; Crime; Warlords; Civil War
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D20 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions

References

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