Scoring rules for judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz (2011): Scoring rules for judgment aggregation.

Abstract

This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called 'scoring rules' after their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the collective judgments which reach the highest total 'score' across the individuals, subject to the judgments having to be rational. Depending on how we define 'scores', we obtain several (old and new) solutions to the judgment aggregation problem, such as distance-based aggregation, premise- and conclusion-based aggregation, truth-tracking rules, and a generalization of Borda rule to judgment aggregation. Scoring rules are shown to generalize the classical scoring rules of preference aggregation theory.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: judgment aggregation, social choice, scoring rules, Hamming rule, Borda rule, distance-based aggregation
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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