Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

Popov, Sergey V. (2012): Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation.

Abstract

I propose a bribery model with decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy's productivity due to suppression of small businesses, and reduces the total graft even though it might increase the individual bribe amount. The coordinated deviation to a better participation equilibrium is impossible due to decentralization. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary, might be useful if they invite better participation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corruption; bribery; decentralization
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption

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