Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market

Bar-Isaac, Heski and Gavazza, Alessandro (2013): Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market.

Abstract

We use new data from a rental brokers' multiple listings service to examine the contractual agreements between landlords and brokers. The data display two sources of variation in the way in which agents are compensated: 1) 69 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the other 31 percent are non-exclusive); and 2) in 23 percent of listings, landlords commit to pay the agent's fee (in the other 77 percent, the agent collects the fee from the tenant). We show that contracts vary according to apartment characteristics and market conditions. Specifically, landlords are more likely to sign exclusive agreements with agents for more-atypical apartments and are more likely to pay brokers' fees when apartments are in rent-stabilized buildings and when local vacancy rates are higher.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Real estate, Brokers, Rent-regulation, Exclusive
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L85 - Real Estate Services; R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location > R31 - Housing Supply and Markets

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