Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games

Chameni Nembua, Célestin and Demsou, Themoi (2013): Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games.

Abstract

The paper studies the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient and Symmetry (LES) values in TU-games. It demonstrates that most of the results obtained by Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of semivalues and simple games are transposable on LES values and the whole TU-games set. In particular, linear and weakly linear games are analyzed. We characterize both values which are ordinal equivalent in all TU-games. Pigou-Dalton transfers are introduced for social comparison of values and to shed light on the way payoffs are redistributed from a value to another.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cooperative games; desirability relation; linear values; linear games; Pigou-Dalton transfers; concentration, Lorenz dominance.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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