Left, right, left: income, learning and political dynamics

Morrow, John and Carter, Michael (2013): Left, right, left: income, learning and political dynamics.

Abstract

The political left turn in Latin America, which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more, challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior. This paper generalizes the forward-looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic, non-concave income processes. The model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present. In contrast, under imperfect information, a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences occurs. Simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that imperfect information better accounts for the shift back to the left, and offers additional insights about political dynamics.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: income dynamics, redistributive politics, polarization, Bayesian learning, Latin America
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems

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