Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
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Abstract
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Institution: | Bogazici University |
Original Title: | College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Many-to-one matching; early action; early decision; college admissions |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations |
Item ID: | 4526 |
Depositing User: | Ismail Saglam |
Date Deposited: | 18 Aug 2007 |
Last Modified: | 08 Oct 2019 09:40 |
References: | Avery, C., Fairbanks, A. and Zeckhauser, R. The Early Admissions Game: Joining the Elite. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 69(1), 9-15. Konishi, H. and Unver, M.U. "Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets," Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27(1), 3-24. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2007. "College Admissions under Early Decision," MPRA Paper 1906, University Library of Munich, Germany. Roth, A.E. "The College Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, 1985, 36(2), 277-288. Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. London/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/4526 |
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College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision? (deposited 16 Jun 2007)
- College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision? (deposited 18 Aug 2007) [Currently Displayed]