The Impact of Corporate Board Meetings on Corporate Performance in South Africa

Ntim, Collins G. (2011): The Impact of Corporate Board Meetings on Corporate Performance in South Africa. Published in: African Review of Economics and Finance , Vol. 2, No. 2 (29 August 2011): pp. 83-103.

Abstract

We investigate the impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance for a sample of 169 listed corporations from 2002 to 2007 in South Africa (SA). Our findings suggest a statistically significant and positive association between the frequency of corporate board meetings and corporate performance, implying that SA boards that meet more frequently tend to generate higher financial performance. A further investigation indicates a significant non-monotonic link between the frequency of corporate board meetings and corporate performance, suggesting that either a relatively small or large number of corporate board meetings impacts positively on corporate performance. Our findings are consistent across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities and corporate performance proxies. Our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that corporate boards that meet more frequently have increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline management, and thereby improving corporate financial performance.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate governance, corporate board meetings, corporate performance, King II, South Africa, endogeneity
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation

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