Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

Lombardi, Michele and Yoshihara, Naoki (2011): Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization.

Abstract

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Implementation, Nash equilibrium, social choice correspondences, partial honesty, Condition μ*.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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