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Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists

Beard, Rodney (2007): Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists.

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Abstract

In this paper an interest group model of rent seeking behaviour between sugarcane farmers and environmental protectionists is developed. The motivation for this scenario comes from the debate over fertilizer run-off and its possible impact on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. The paper takes Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking model and applies it to the bargaining process over controls on fertilizer application in an effort to learn something about the likely political outcomes of this debate.

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