Tatom, John (2007): China currency dispute: is a rise in the yuan inevitable, necessary or desirable?
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Abstract
China-bashing has become a popular media and political sport. This is largely due to the U.S. trade imbalance and the belief, by some, that China is responsible for it because it manipulates its currency to hold down the dollar prices of its goods, unfairly creating a trade advantage that has contributed to the loss of U.S. businesses and jobs. This paper reviews the problem of the large trade imbalance that the United States has with China and its relationship to Chinese exchange rate policy. It examines the link between a Chinese renminbi appreciation and the trade balance and also whether a generalized dollar decline could solve the global or Chinese U.S. trade imbalance. The consensus view explained here is that a renminbi appreciation is not likely to fix either the trade imbalance with China or overall. Though these perceived benefits of a managed float are small or non-existent, perhaps they should be pursued anyway because of small costs or even benefits for China. Section IV looks at the costs of a managed float in terms of the benefits of the earlier peg. Opponents of a fixed dollar/yuan exchange rate ignore the costs of a managed float for China, especially with limits on currency convertibility. These costs are outlined here in order to provide an economic basis for the earlier fixed rate and China’s reluctance to appreciate. Finally it is suggested that the necessary convertibility on capital account, toward which China is moving, could easily result in yuan depreciation under a floating rate regime. This is hardly the end that China critics have in mind and it is not one that would improve U.S. or other trade imbalances with China.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | China currency dispute: is a rise in the yuan inevitable, necessary or desirable? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | exchange rate policy; China; currency manipulation; current account imbalance |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies |
Item ID: | 5366 |
Depositing User: | John Tatom |
Date Deposited: | 29 Nov 2007 00:20 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 22:25 |
References: | Bailey, Martin Neil, and Robert Z. Lawrence, “Can America Still Compete or Does It Need a New Paradigm?” Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. 4-9, December 2006. Bergsten, C. Fred, “The IMF and Exchange Rates,” Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, May 19, 2004. Cheung, Yin-Wong, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujil, “The Overvaluation of Renminbi Undervaluation,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12850, June 2007. Goldstein, Morris, “Currency Manipulation and Enforcing the Rules of the International Monetary System, paper prepared for the Institute for International Economics, September 23, 2005. Sanford, Jonathan E, Currency Manipulation: The IMF and WTO, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, May 7, 2007. McKinnon, Ronald I., “Currency Wars,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2005. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/5366 |