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Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Network Investment, Access and Competition

Inderst, Roman and Peitz, Martin (2012): Network Investment, Access and Competition. Published in: Telecommunications Policy , Vol. 36, No. 5 (June 2012): pp. 407-418.

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Abstract

We analyze the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, we show that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of investment, but to a wider roll-out compared to a market in which such contracts cannot be offered. In comparison to such ex-post contracts, ex-ante contracts lead to an even wider roll-out, but to a less frequent duplication of investments. Ex-ante contracts in particular, but also ex-post contracts, can be used to dampen competition.

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