Deadly Contests An economic note on al Qaeda’s reward system

Caruso, Raul and Locatelli, Andrea (2007): Deadly Contests An economic note on al Qaeda’s reward system.

Abstract

The aim of this brief paper is to interpret al Qaeda’s modus operandi in the light of the economic theory of contests. The main idea expressed here is that al Qaeda can be considered as a contest-designer rewarding an indivisible prize. Affiliated groups compete with each other to win the prize. The argument is discussed and some tentative policy prescriptions are presented.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano
• Language: English
• Keywords: terrorism; contest; al Qaeda; open source; reward; prize setting
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

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