Britain's electricity capacity auctions: lessons from Colombia and New England

Harbord, David and Pagnozzi, Marco (2014): Britain's electricity capacity auctions: lessons from Colombia and New England.

Abstract

The jury is still out on the need for government-organized capacity markets in order to achieve efficient long-run investments in electricity generation. When new capacity markets are introduced, however, it is important that they are well designed and take account of existing experience and previous design failures. Experience in both Colombia and New England provide a stark warning about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions at the center of electricity capacity markets. Among alternative auction design options, a sealed-bid auction is a better choice.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Capacity markets; auctions; New England; Colombia; UK
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy; L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities

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