Firmes industrielles concurrence et corruption

Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Firmes industrielles concurrence et corruption.

Abstract

This paper examines the main determinants of firms tax evasion and corruption in the formal industrial sector. In our model psychological morale of bureaucratic agents are important to explain corruption.It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in fostering corruption. Therfore, this endemic corruption can explain the lack of productive performance of industrial . Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Industrial firms competition and corruption
• Language: French
• Keywords: Industrial Firms , Competition ,Tax Evasion ,Corruption, Rents, competition policy,
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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