Spatial Pillage Game

Jung, Hanjoon Michael (2007): Spatial Pillage Game.

Abstract

A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Lahore University of Management Sciences
• Language: English
• Keywords: allocation by force; coalitional games; pillage game; spatial restriction; stable set; farsighted core
• Subjects: R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R1 - General Regional Economics > R19 - Other; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

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