Нобеловата награда за икономика за икономика 2007: Теорията за икономическите механизми

Marinov, Eduard (2008): Нобеловата награда за икономика за икономика 2007: Теорията за икономическите механизми. Published in: Nauka No. 3/2008, ISSN 0861-3362 (February 2008): pp. 19-26.

Abstract

The paper discusses the main contributions of the Nobel prize in economics laureates for 2007 Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory". The paper presents the main concepts and applications of the mechanism design theory.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The Nobel Price for Economics 2007: The Design of Economic Institutions
• Language: Bulgarian
• Keywords: Nobel prize in Economics, Hurwicz, Maskin, Myerson, mechanism design theory
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B0 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B20 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B3 - History of Economic Thought: Individuals > B31 - Individuals

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