Dissecting the brains of central bankers: the case of the ECB's Governing Council members on reforms

Bennani, Hamza (2015): Dissecting the brains of central bankers: the case of the ECB's Governing Council members on reforms. Forthcoming in: International Economics (2015)

Abstract

Since 2009, European central bankers have supported some reforms, in order to draw roadmaps to get out of the euro debt crisis. This paper tests whether the educational and professional background of European central bankers matter for the type of reforms each of them advocated. Through a textual analysis of public speeches delivered by the European central bankers, we draw a cognitive map for each of them and, thus, of the reforms they propose as ways out of the euro debt crisis. Our results show that their occupational background is an important determinant of their respective economic reform proposals.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: European Central Bank, Monetary Policy, Euro debt crisis, Cognitive mapping
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E42 - Monetary Systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the Monetary System ; Payment Systems; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H12 - Crisis Management

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