Mitra, Anirban and Mitra, Shabana (2015): Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and the Middle Class. Forthcoming in: Economic Journal
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Abstract
We investigate how increased electoral competition — by influencing the equilibrium policies of competing parties — affects the income distribution in society. Our model is embedded in a standard probabilistic voting setup where parties compete at two stages: (i) they allocate resources across various districts and (ii) then, for each district, they divide the resources among the different constituent groups. We show that an increase in electoral competition in a district results in a tendency towards equalization of incomes therein. We check for these relationships using data from the Indian national elections which are combined with household-level consumption expenditure data rounds from NSSO (1987-88 and 2004-05) to yield a panel of Indian districts. We find that districts which have experienced tight elections exhibit lower inequality and polarization which indicates a larger "middle class".
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and the Middle Class |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Income distribution, polarization, political economy, targeting. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O2 - Development Planning and Policy > O20 - General |
Item ID: | 66990 |
Depositing User: | Anirban Mitra |
Date Deposited: | 01 Oct 2015 04:54 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 21:19 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/66990 |