André, Francisco J. and de Castro, Luis Miguel (2015): Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with Oligopoly Competition.
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Abstract
Prior research has shown, firstly, that firms subjected to a cap-and-trade system can enjoy scarcity rents and, secondly, that they can manipulate the price of permits as a rent seeking behaviour. We analyse these issues using a duopoly model under Cournot and Stackelberg competition. We identify the different sources of scarcity rents and determine under which conditions they can generate incentives for the firms to lobby the permit price up. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, Stackelberg competition eliminates incentives to collude if ther is no grandfathering. However, such incentives appear if there is an initial free allocation of permits, which is a policy argument against grandfathering. This effect is increasing with the amount of permits allocated to the leader and those parameter changes that undermine the leader’s advantage in output production or reduce the leader’s abatement cost.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with Oligopoly Competition |
English Title: | Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with Oligopoly Competition |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Emissions permits, Collusion, Market power, Duopoly, Stackelberg model |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy |
Item ID: | 67812 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Francisco J Andre |
Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2015 17:43 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 09:38 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/67812 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition. (deposited 03 Feb 2015 06:25)
- Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with Oligopoly Competition. (deposited 19 Nov 2015 17:43) [Currently Displayed]