The China Syndrome in US: Import Competition, Crime, and Government Transfer

Che, Yi and Xu, Xun (2015): The China Syndrome in US: Import Competition, Crime, and Government Transfer.

Abstract

In this paper, we exploit the exogenous rise of Chinese imports in US to investigate the effect of import competition on crime at county level. Our results indicate that counties with high exposure to Chinese import competition are with high crime rates while the exposure effect on property crime is much larger than that for violent crime: one standard deviation increase of exposure will increase 2.1 more violent crimes in the county while such increase of exposure will cause 26.5 more property crimes. Interestingly, we find that the crime impact of exposure to Chinese import competition disappears in counties with high government transfer.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Chinese Import Competition; US Crime; Government
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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