Evolution-Based Approaches in Economics and Evolutionary Loss of Information

Heinrich, Torsten (2015): Evolution-Based Approaches in Economics and Evolutionary Loss of Information.

Abstract

Evolutionary economics provides a self-organizing stabilizing mechanism without relying on mechanic equilibria. However, there are substantial differences between the genetic evolutionary biology, and the evolution of institutions, firms, routines or strategies in economics. Most importantly, there is no genetic codification and no sexual reproduction in economic evolution, and the involved agents can interfere consciously and purposefully. This entails a general lack of fixation and perhaps the quick loss of information through a Muller's ratchet like mechanism. The present contribution discusses the analogy of evolution in biology and economics and considers potential problems resulting in evolutionary models in economics.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: evolutionary economics; evolutionary loss of information; error catastrophe; resilience
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B25 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary ; Austrian; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes

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