SPESA PUBBLICA E CRIMINALITÀ ORGANIZZATA IN ITALIA EVIDENZA EMPIRICA SU DATI PANEL NEL PERIODO 1997-2003

Caruso, Raul (2008): SPESA PUBBLICA E CRIMINALITÀ ORGANIZZATA IN ITALIA EVIDENZA EMPIRICA SU DATI PANEL NEL PERIODO 1997-2003.

Abstract

[ENGLISH]This work presents original results regarding the relationship between economic life and organised crime in Italy. This empirical study is underpinned by some theoretical insights drawn from conflict and rent-seeking theories. Then the paper presents a panel analysis including the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. The results show that : (a) a significant positive association does exist between investments in real estate sector and the index of organised crime; (b) a significant positive association does exist between public investments and the index of organised crime index; (c) a significant negative association does exist between social protection expenditures and the index of organised crime; (d) a significant negative association does exist between investments in private investments and the index of organised crime. [ITALIAN] In questo lavoro si presentano risultati nuovi inerenti al legame tra sistema economico e criminalità organizzata. Sulla base di alcuni intuizioni teoriche derivate dalle teoria economiche del rent-seeking e dei conflitti, è stata costruita un’analisi panel per le 20 regioni italiane nel periodo 1997-2003. I risultati dell’analisi empirica mostrano che: (a) esiste un’associazione positiva significativa tra gli investimenti nel settore delle costruzioni e l’indice di criminalità organizzata; (b) Esiste una associazione positiva significativa tra gli investimenti della pubblica amministrazione e l’indice di criminalità organizzata; (c) Esiste un’associazione negativa significativa tra la spesa per protezione sociale e l’indice di criminalità organizzata; (d) Esiste un’associazione negativa significativa tra gli investimenti in industria in senso stretto e l’indice di criminalità organizzata.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: Italian
• Keywords: [ENGLISH]organised crime, rent-seeking, conflict, monopoly, panel data, Mafia. [ITALIAN]crimine organizzato, rent-seeking, conflitto, monopolio, panel data, Mafia
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E26 - Informal Economy ; Underground Economy; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H39 - Other; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

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