Pagnozzi, Marco and Saral, Krista J. (2016): Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale.
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Abstract
We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market. There is always one positive-value bidder, and either one to two speculators who may choose whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive profits on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | speculators, entry, multi-object auctions, resale, economic experiments |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions |
Item ID: | 70022 |
Depositing User: | Krista J. Saral |
Date Deposited: | 15 Mar 2016 06:42 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 11:11 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/70022 |