Optimal abatement and taxation for internalizing externalities: A dynamic game with feedback strategies

Halkos, George and Papageorgiou, George (2016): Optimal abatement and taxation for internalizing externalities: A dynamic game with feedback strategies.

Abstract

In this paper we consider a dynamic nonzero-sum game between the polluting firms and the authorities. Although the proposed game is not easily solvable for the feedback case, i.e., it is not the linear quadratic case of game and not a degenerated case, we calculate explicitly a stationary feedback equilibrium. In the proposed game the regulator has the ability to turn the optimal allocation of their efforts between abatement and taxation of the polluting firms. During the game, the regulator’s criterion is the minimization of the total discounted costs, while the criterion of the polluting firms is their utility maximization. Next, sensitivity analyses regarding the efficiency parameters of both players are provided. The conclusions are that a farsighted regulator should put much effort in abatement measures (instead of taxation measures) as well as in the improvement of abatement efficiency.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Differential games; Feedback equilibrium; Taxation; Pollution abatement.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs ; Distributional Effects ; Employment Effects; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy

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